CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

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Misconceptions about Constitutional Amendment - Updated
by N.C. Mehta

Cite as : (2001) 1 SCC (Jour) 29

There have been a lot of misconceptions about the exact interpretation and impact of the amendment effected by sub-clause (b) of clause (29-A) of Article 366 of the Constitution. It reads thus:

"366. Definitions.—In this Constitution, unless the context otherwise requires, the following expressions have the meanings hereby respectively assigned to them, that is to say— ... (29-A) 'tax on the sale or purchase of goods' includes — ... (b) a tax on the transfer of property in goods (whether as goods or in some other form) involved in the execution of a works contract;" (emphasis supplied)

This means that for the application of sub-clause (b) one has to refer to the various articles of the Constitution wherein the expression "tax on the sale or purchase of goods" is used and nowhere else, certainly not outside the Constitution. This important aspect of the amendment is however quite often overlooked.

Articles covered

The said expression "tax on the sale or purchase of goods" is found in the following provisions of the Constitution:

(1) Entry 92-A of List I in the Seventh Schedule refers to "taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers, where such sale or purchase takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce". As this entry has to be read in the context of Article 246(1), Parliament gets the exclusive power to make laws to levy tax on such deemed sales also. This can be done by Parliament by amendment of Section 2(g) and Section 6 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (the Central Act). However, such amendment not having been done, deemed sales taking place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce cannot be subjected to tax under the Central Act. So has also been held by the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Thomson Press (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana1

(2) In the context of the above provision clause (3) of Article 269 read with sub-clause (g) of clause (1) thereof provided that Parliament may by law formulate principles for determination when a sale or purchase of goods takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. (Principles enacted under Section 3 of the Central Act.)

(3) Entry 54 of List II in the Seventh Schedule refers to "taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers, subject to the provisions of Entry 92-A of List I". In other words, States do not have the power to levy sales tax on inter-State sales as well as inter-State deemed sales. As this Entry 54 has to be read in the context of Article 246(2), State Legislature gets the exclusive power to make laws to levy tax on deemed sales as well, which all States have done, provided they are not inter-State or in the course of import or export of goods.

(4) Clause (1) of Article 286 provides that "no law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place (a) outside the State; or (b) in the course of the import of the goods into, or export of the goods out of, the territory of India". Thus deemed sale cannot be subjected to tax under a State sales tax law when it takes place outside the State or in the course of import into, or export out of, the territory of India.

(5) To effectuate the above provisions, clause (2) of Article 286 provides that Parliament may by law formulate principles for determining when a sale or purchase of goods takes place in any of the ways mentioned in clause (1), that is, when it would be deemed to take place outside the State (principles enacted under Section 4 of the Central Act) or in the course of import or export of goods (principles enacted under Section 5 of the Central Act).

(6) The expression "tax on the sale or purchase of goods" also appears in clause (3)(a) of Article 286, which provides that "any law of a State shall, insofar as it imposes, or authorises the imposition of, - (a) a tax on the sale or purchase of goods declared by Parliament by law to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce; ... be subject to such restrictions and conditions in regard to the system of levy, rates and other incidents of the tax as Parliament may by law specify". Parliament has implemented these provisions through enactment of Sections 14 and 15 of the Central Act.

Articles & Acts not covered

The following articles of the Constitution are not covered by the constitutional amendment as they do not have the definition "tax on the sale or purchase of goods", though they cover sales and/or goods:

Article 287 referring to tax on the consumption or sale of electricity (which is goods). Article 288 referring to tax in respect of water or electricity stored. Entry 52 in List II in the Seventh Schedule covering taxes on the entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein. In some cases it has been wrongly held that sub-clause (b) of clause (29-A) of Article 366 is applicable to this entry. Entry 53 in List II providing for taxes on the consumption or sale of electricity.

Similarly, Article 366(29)(b) does not impinge on Sale of Goods Act, 1930, in particular Section 64-A thereof, and Indian Contracts Act, 1872 and other laws dealing with sales and/or goods.

Supreme Court's observations

Observations of the Supreme Court in Gannon Dunkerley & Co. v. State of Rajasthan2 at pp. 226-27 to the following effect have to be read and understood in the context of the above provisions of the Constitution.

The Supreme Court has observed at STC pp. 226-27 that the Central Sales Tax Act is a law in respect of (i) formulation of principles under Section 3 of the Central Act, vide Article 269(3), (ii) formulation of principles under Sections 4 and 5 of the Central Act, vide Article 286(2), and (iii) provisions about declared goods under Sections 14 and 15 of the Central Act, vide Article 286(3)(a). It is a composite law enacted under Entry 92-A of List I read with clause (1) of Article 269 as well as under clause (3) of Article 286 and sub-clause (a) of clause (3) of Article 286. Chapter II of the Central Act contains Sections 3, 4 and 5, Chapter III of the Central Act contains Sections 6 to 13 and Chapter IV of the Central Act contains Sections 14 and 15. Thus provisions of Chapters II and IV of the Central Act apply to deemed sales by reason of the aforesaid amendments/application of the various articles of the Constitution, which is not so for Chapter III containing Sections 6 to 13 of the Central Act. Section 6 read with Section 2(g) of the Central Act is not amended to cover deemed sales and hence inter-State deemed sales are outside the purview of the Central Act. For the same reason and as a corollary of it, as Section 8 has not been amended, provisions thereof about issue of C form declarations while effecting inter-State purchases of goods for execution of works contracts, or for that matter for leasing cannot be invoked. State Governments administratively allowing such issue is a different matter.

It is in the above context the Supreme Court observed at STC p. 227 (SCC p. 388) :

"The question is whether in the absence of an amendment in the Central Sales Tax Act specifically applying its provisions to a transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of a works contract, the provisions of Sections 3, 4 and 5 contained in Chapter II can be held applicable to such a transfer."

Giving the background of the amendment at STC p. 228 (SCC p. 389) Supreme Court observed:

"For the reasons aforesaid, we are of the view that even in the absence of any amendment having been made in the Central Sales Tax Act (after the Forty-sixth Amendment) expressly including transfers of property in goods involved in execution of a works contract, the provisions contained in Sections 3, 4 and 5 would be applicable to such transfers.... For the same reasons Sections 14 and 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act would also be applicable to the deemed sales resulting from transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of a works contract...."

These observations cannot be applied to Sections 6 to 13 of the Central Act.

High Courts' judgments

In Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. CTO3 a Single Judge of the Madras High Court, dissenting from the Kerala High Court judgment in Dy. Commr. of Agricultural Income Tax and Sales Tax v. P.K. Biriyumma4 observed at STC p. 431:

"If therefore under the local sales tax law of the appropriate State, as has been held by the Apex Court in Builders' Assn. of India case5, the States are entitled to levy sales tax on the price of goods and materials used in works contracts as if there was a sale of such goods and materials, the dealers like the petitioners become entitled to purchase materials for their use in the execution of the works contracts by the issue of the 'C' forms, notwithstanding the Central Amendment Act 31 of 1958."

It is submitted that the Court had not the benefit of the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court in Gannon Dunkerley case6. In N.J. Devani Builders (P) Ltd. v. STO7 the Gujarat High Court in this regard concurred with the view of the Madras High Court in the Larsen & Toubro case3 following the judgments in Unitech Ltd. v. CTO8 and Beekay Engg. Corpn. v. State of Bihar9. Both these cases were decided before the Supreme Court judgment in Gannon Dunkerley case2. In Devani Builders case7 at STC pp. 521-22 the Gujarat High Court observed:

"A person purchasing the goods in the course of inter-State trade and commerce for selling the same 'intra-State' or 'outside the State' is also eligible and entitled to use and furnish a declaration in form 'C' and in that event also there is no breach of the condition, if they do so, though in that event no provision of the Central Act is at all attracted. Holding otherwise will result in very anomalous and absurd result that even though a dealer is held liable to pay tax under State law on such subsequent transaction and he pays such tax duly, yet as per claim of Revenue he will be held guilty of committing breach of declaration, because such sales are not sales under Section 2(g) of the CST Act. This is obviously not the intended object."

It is difficult to understand this logic and find in the observations of the Supreme Court the intended object underlying the constitutional amendment. It is submitted that the Kerala High Court has correctly decided the issue in Dy. Commr. v. P.K. Biriyumma case4.

Legal fiction

Another misconception is about "legal fiction" referred to by the Supreme Court in Builders' Assn. case5. The Forty-sixth Amendment about deemed sales has been only in the context of the States' and Parliament's power to levy tax on the deemed sale resulting from execution of a works contract, treating the particular indivisible works contract to be a divisible one. This fiction does not convert the indivisible works contract into a divisible one for any other purpose whatsoever, either in law or in facts, even for the purposes of C form declarations to be issued by the contractee. It provides that transfer of property in individual goods or materials during execution of the works contract would be deemed to be sales of respective goods and materials. Consequently provisions of the State sales tax laws would be applicable on that basis. The States, therefore, should be entitled to levy tax on such individual deemed sales at the rates applicable to their sales under the State law or even at a single rate, as laid down in Gannon Dunkerley case2.

Formulating principles

Replying to the contention raised on behalf of the States to the effect that a deemed sale resulting from transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of a works contract can never be a sale in the course of inter-State trade or commerce or it cannot be an outside sale or a sale in the course of import, relying upon a number of Supreme Court decisions, the Supreme Court in Gannon Dunkerley case10 observed: (SCC p. 391)

"We do not propose to go into this controversy because the question whether a deemed sale resulting from transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of a particular works contract amounts to a sale in the course of inter-State trade or commerce under Section 3 of the Central Sales Tax Act or an outside sale under Section 4 of the Central Sales Tax Act or a sale in the course of import under Section 5 of the Central Sales Tax Act has to be decided in the light of the particular terms of the works contract and it cannot be decided in the abstract. As at present advised, we are not in a position to say that in no case, can there be a sale in the course of inter-State trade or commerce or an outside sale or a sale in the course of import in respect of a deemed sale resulting from transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of a works contract falling within the ambit of sub-clause (b) of clause (29-A) of Article 366 of the Constitution." (emphasis supplied)

The underlined words should imply that the view canvassed on behalf of the States may be acceptable on a further consideration by the Supreme Court. In my view there is substance in the contention raised for the States as taxable event in the case of a deemed sale as respects a works contract can be only a local incident taking place when and where accretion takes place. Sale has several elements some of which can take place in one State while the rest in another State, execution of which may of necessity involve inter-State movement, or import into India, of goods. So also a works contract has several elements. However, constitutional amendment has picked up only one element as the taxable event.

Construction of Sections 3 and 5

There is yet another misconception about applicability of Sections 3 and 5 of the Central Act. While as observed by the Supreme Court Section 3 applies to a deemed sale as respects a works contract, the question is whether clause (b) thereof can be applicable to deemed sales as respects works contracts. Clause (a) of Section 3 may apply to a sale whereunder property in the goods agreed to be sold may pass in the State of despatch or in the State of destination as observed by the Supreme Court in Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. S.R. Sarkar11. In the case of a deemed sale as respects a works contract, property in the goods can pass only in the destination State in which accretion would be carried out at the work site. With this distinction clause (a) should apply to such a deemed sale also. However, position of clause (b) is different. Where sale is concluded by transfer of documents of title to the goods and property in the goods thereby passes during the inter-State movement of goods, clause (b) of Section 3 would be applicable. Under a contract of sale property in the goods can pass on actual delivery of goods as goods being physically delivered, or on constructive or notional delivery of goods by transfer of documents of title to the goods or by symbolic delivery of goods on the key of the godown wherein goods are stored being handed over to the buyer. In the case of a deemed sale as respects a works contract, property can pass only on accretion or accession, which can never take place when the goods or materials meant for execution of the works contract are in movement from one State to another. Thus such deemed sale can never fall under clause (b) of Section 3.

Where a sale occasions import of goods into the territory of India, it would be covered by the first limb of Section 5(2), whereunder property in the goods might have passed out of India before commencement of course of import or in India after termination of the course of import. Second limb of Section 5(2) covers a sale which is effected by transfer of documents of title to the goods before the goods have crossed the customs frontiers of India within the meaning of Section 2(ab) of the Central Act. For the reasons stated above about applicability of clause (b) of Section 3, second limb of Section 5(2) also cannot be applicable to deemed sales as respects works contracts.

Unless contract to contrary

In Builders' Assn. case5 at STC pp. 400-01 the Supreme Court had observed: (SCC p. 673)

"Ordinarily unless there is a contract to the contrary in the case of a works contract the property in the goods used in the construction of a building passes to the owner of the land on which the building is constructed, when the goods or materials used are incorporated in the building."

Reference here to "contract to the contrary" is so construed that in the case of an indivisible works contract it can be provided that property in the goods involved in the execution of the work would pass before incorporation thereof in the work. Such stipulation would make the contract a divisible one. In the case of an indivisible works contract transfer of property does not take place under a contract; it is transferred on the principle of accretion, to the landholder who may be the owner, lessee or licensee of the land; it is transferred on the principle of accession to the owner of any other asset to which accession takes place. Thus if A owns a car which is given to his friend B for use, who sends the driver C to fetch grocery from the market and the car meets with an accident en route and hence C gets it repaired by garage-owner D. D replaces new parts for damaged parts of the car for a lump-sum charge, under a works contract. In this case property in the new parts provided by D would not pass to C, from C to B and then from B to A. It would pass directly to A, even though A will have no contract with D, nay, he may not even have knowledge of the accident. Thus reference by the Supreme Court to "unless there is contract to the contrary" can be in the context only of a divisible works contract. What is stated above about repair of the car should equally be applicable to transfer of the property in the materials provided by the sub-contractor for execution of the works contract on a principal-to-principal basis, which would directly pass to the ultimate customer, the landholder or owner of the asset for whom work might have been carried out. To appreciate this legal position one has to imbibe the principle explained in great detail by the Supreme Court in Builders' Assn. case5, culling out extracts from Hudson's Building Contracts (8th Edn.) and other treatises. Hudson's Building and Engineering Contracts (10th Edn.) also may be referred to. Unfortunately the States have not appreciated this legal position vis-a-vis sub-contracts, to which extent State laws are defective.

Article 366(29-A)(b)

Sub-clause (b) refers to transfer of property in goods (whether as goods or in some other form) involved in the execution of a works contract. Bracketed words have great significance, to be read along with transfer of property in goods, the word "as" having been used as an adverb. "As" means in the manner. The expression "involved in the execution of a works contract" also goes with transfer of property in goods. "Involve" means to have within or as part of itself (Webster's Third New International Dictionary, p. 1191). "In" means "during the course of" (Webster's Third New International Dictionary, p. 1139). The expression "as goods or in some other form" means form other than that of goods. "Form" here cannot mean shape or size of goods. When transfer of property in goods has to be as goods or in some other form, the word "form" should mean "moveability", other form being "immovability". This construction is appropriate when context and content of clause (b) are considered. What it means is that when transfer of property in the thing, which has to be goods (moveable property), takes place, it would take place in such manner that the thing in which property would pass would continue to be goods (moveable property) or it would take the other form, that is, it would form part of an immovable property. Thus, when new parts are replaced in a car for damaged parts under a works contract, property in the new parts would pass while the same would continue to be goods. When bricks are used during construction of a building, bricks would form part of the building, an immovable property. Execution of a works contract should involve transfer of property in goods in such manner, that is, transfer of property in goods in such manner should take place during the course of and as a part of execution of the works contract, and not after the execution thereof is over. This test is satisfied only if property in the goods passes on the principle of accretion or accession when the works contract is being executed. Thus where property in the goods passes after the work is executed, the transaction would not be covered by sub-clause (b), as in the case of contract for the delivery of printed material against payment, assuming that printing job can be treated as a "works contract", which certainly it is not, in any event not in the context of sub-clause (b).

What is "works contract"?

The above interpretation of sub-clause (b) gets full support from the law explained by the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal in Studio Kamalalaya v. CTO12. In para 46 the Tribunal has observed that only those transactions where vesting of property occurs not by contract but on the theory of accretion and accession are covered by the constitutional amendment in question. Article 366(29-A)(b) envisages those works contracts where the contractor works on the property of the contractee and affixes his own materials to that property in the execution of the said contract and in the process passing of property in such materials takes place resulting in deemed sale.

The above interpretation is in conformity with the history of the case-law before the constitutional amendment which was concerned to decide whether the transactions were sales or non-sales wherein property had passed on accretion/accession, which was so in most of the reported cases, as regards moveable as well as immovable properties.

"Works contracts" - special connotation

Sub-clause (b) refers to execution of a works contract. While the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal held the application of sub-clause (b) to the works contract of the type referred to in its judgment, the Supreme Court in Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. CIT13 in the context of the application of sub-section (1) of Section 194-C of the Income Tax Act, 1961, at ITR p. 440 observed: (SCC p. 560)

"There is nothing in the sub-section which could make us hold that the contract to carry out a work or the contract to supply labour to carry out a work should be confined to 'works contracts' as was argued on behalf of the appellant. We see no reason to curtail or to cut down the meaning of plain words used in the section. 'Any work' means any work and not a 'works contract', which has a special connotation in the tax law." (emphasis supplied)

In this case the Court referred to the expression works contract in inverted commas as "works contracts" at two places. In Builders' Assn. case5 the Supreme Court at STC p. 403 referred to works contracts in inverted commas as "works contracts" at as many as five places. Thus Article 366(29-A)(b) should cover transfer of property during execution of such a transaction which is known as works contract in common parlance and whereunder property passes on the theory of accretion or accession. In this context the Full Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in Sarvodaya Printing Press v. State of Maharashtra14 has to be noticed. The Court held that the material printed by the applicant in that case was not "goods", a marketable commodity and hence the transaction was not the contract for the sale of printed material but the same was a works contract, while the Court accepted that it was a jobwork. The High Court also observed at STC p. 390:

"Paper and ink used were no doubt property of the applicant before printing, but thereafter they became the property of the MPEB by theory of accretion." (emphasis supplied)

It is submitted that holding the transaction before the Court, a jobwork, to be a works contract and transfer of property in the paper and ink being held to take place on the theory of accretion, are both contrary to the law discussed above. In State of Maharashtra v. Sarvodaya Printing Press15 the Supreme Court reproduced the High Court's judgment wherein the Supreme Court's judgment in State of T.N. v. Anandam Viswanathan16 was relied on, and observed that having regard to the fact as found the Court saw no error in the conclusion of the High Court. It should be pertinent to note that in State of T.N. v. Anandam Viswanathan case16 the Supreme Court had observed:

"In our opinion, the contract in this case is one, having regard to the nature of the job to be done and the confidence reposed, for work to be done for remuneration and supply of paper was just incidental." (STC p. 14, SCC p. 628)

The Supreme Court did not describe the transaction before it as a works contract to be executed for payment of contract price. The Supreme Court held that the case before it, having regard to the nature of the job to be done and the confidence reposed, was for work to be done for remuneration and supply of paper was just incidental.

Rainbow Colour Lab case

That the expression "works contract" would not mean any transaction which would involve work besides the supply or use of materials is amply borne out by the judgment delivered by the Supreme Court in Rainbow Colour Lab v. State of M.P.17 In this case the issue was whether the job rendered by a photographer in taking photographs, developing and printing films would amount to a works contract as contemplated by Article 366(29-A)(b) read with Section 2(m) of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act. The High Court relying on Builders' Assn. case5 held that to the extent of the photo paper used in the printing of positive prints there was transfer of property in goods. Therefore the job done by the appellant was a works contract. In Asstt. STO v. B.C. Kame18 the Supreme Court had held that the contract to take photograph, develop the negative, or to do other photographic work and thereafter supply the prints to the client was a contract for use of skill and labour to bring about a desired result. The said judgment having been rendered prior to the 46th Amendment of the Constitution the Supreme Court had to consider whether the said amendment had brought about any change so as to doubt the legal position enunciated in that (Kame18) case. The Supreme Court observed: (SCC pp. 388-89)

"All that has happened in law after the 46th Amendment and the judgment of this Court in Builders' case5 is that it is now open to the States to divide the works contract into two separate contracts by a legal fiction: (i) contract for sale of goods involved in the said works contract, and (ii) for supply of labour and service. This division of contract under the amended law can be made only if the works contract involved a dominant intention to transfer the property in goods and not in contracts where the transfer in property takes place as an incident of contract of service. The amendment, referred to above, has not empowered the State to indulge in a microscopic division of contracts involving the value of materials used incidentally in such contracts. What is pertinent to ascertain in this connection is what was the dominant intention of the contract. Every contract, be it a service contract or otherwise, may involve the use of some material or the other in execution of the said contract. The State is not empowered by the amended law to impose sales tax on such incidental materials used in such contracts."(emphasis supplied)

In support the Supreme Court referred to its judgment in Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. State of Karnataka19 and that in Everest Copiers v. State of T.N.20 The Supreme Court also referred to the Kerala High Court judgment in Bavens v. Union of India21 and observed that it was in agreement with the view taken by the Kerala High Court reproducing the observations of the High Court. In this case the High Court had, in the case of photography, observed that the negative which was subjected to further processing belonged to the photographer and not to the customer. No basic goods were provided by the customer which were subjected to processing, etc. by the photographer so as to make the contract a works contract. There was no accretion to goods on property or the nucleus of a property which originally belonged to the customer. There was no works contract involved in this category of a photographer's activity. If any property passes to the customer in form of photographic paper, it is only incidental to the service contract. Thus transfer of property in goods on the theory of accretion, in the context of Article 366(29-A)(b), should be taken as sine qua non of an indivisible works contract, the Supreme Court having approved the observations of the High Court which have been underlined above. In this case also the Supreme Court referred to works contract in inverted commas as "works contracts" at four places.

Observations of the Supreme Court in Rainbow Colour Lab case17 as regards dominant intention under a works contract about transfer of property in goods as a deemed sale fits in the latter part of clause (29-A) which after referring to sub-clauses (a) to (f) provides "and such transfer, delivery or supply of any goods shall be deemed to be a sale of those goods by the person making the transfer, delivery or supply and a purchase of those goods by the person to whom such transfer, delivery or supply is made". Consumables used or materials supplied incidental to execution of work or rendering of service, as held by the Supreme Court, would not answer this description in the latter part of clause (29-A).

Jobworks excluded

Applying the above tests laid down by the Supreme Court and in the context of the fact that the following transactions are not known as "works contracts" and that property in the goods involved during execution of such contracts does not pass on accretion or accession, the following jobs should be outside the purview of Article 366(29-A)(b):

Printing, book-binding, preparation of blocks and transparency, xeroxing, microfilming, photostatting, cyclostyling, galvanizing, electroplating, photographic and cinematographic works, all types of art works, pest-control and such other jobs to which the above principles are applicable.

1. (1996) 100 STC 417 (P&H) (FB) Return to Text
2. (1993) 1 SCC 364 : (1993) 88 STC 204 (SC) Return to Text
3. (1992) 85 STC 422 (Mad) Return to Text
4. (1991) 83 STC 276 (Ker) Return to Text
5. Builders' Assn. of India v. Union of India, (1989) 2 SCC 645 : (1989) 73 STC 370 (SC) Return to Text
6. (1993) 1 SCC 364 : (1993) 88 STC 204, 227-228 (SC) Return to Text
7. (1995) 99 STC 506 (Guj) Return to Text
8. (1991) 83 STC 207 (AP) Return to Text
9. (1992) 87 STC 509 (Pat) Return to Text
10. (1993) 1 SCC 364, 391 (para 40) : (1993) 88 STC 204, 230 (SC) Return to Text
11. (1960) 11 STC 655 (SC) Return to Text
12. (1993) 89 STC 307 (WBTT) Return to Text
13. (1993) 2 SCC 556 : (1993) 201 ITR 435 (SC) Return to Text
14. (1994) 93 STC 387 (Bom) (FB) Return to Text
15. (1999) 9 SCC 65 : (1999) 114 STC 242 (SC) Return to Text
16. (1989) 1 SCC 613 : (1989) 73 STC 1 (SC) Return to Text
17. (2000) 2 SCC 385 Return to Text
18. (1977) 1 SCC 634 : (1977) 39 STC 237 (SC) Return to Text
19. (1984) 1 SCC 706 : (1984) 55 STC 314, 322 (SC) Return to Text
20. (1996) 5 SCC 390 : (1996) 103 STC 360 (SC) Return to Text
21. (1995) 97 STC 161 (Ker) Return to Text