CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/PRIVACY LAW

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The Right to Privacy in the Age of Information and Communications
by Madhavi Divan*

Cite as : (2002) 4 SCC (Jour) 12

I. The evolution of the law of privacy

The law of privacy is a recognition of the individual's right to be let alone and to have his personal space inviolate. The need for privacy and its recognition as a right is a modern phenomenon. It is the product of an increasingly individualistic society in which the focus has shifted from society to the individual. In early times, the law afforded protection only against physical interference with a person or his property. As civilisation progressed, the personal, intellectual and spiritual facets of the human personality gained recognition and the scope of the law expanded to give protection to these needs.

II. "Privacy" defined

The term "privacy" has been described as "the rightful claim of the individual to determine the extent to which he wishes to share of himself with others and his control over the time, place and circumstances to communicate with others. It means his right to withdraw or to participate as he sees fit. It also means the individual's right to control dissemination of information about himself; it is his own personal possession"1 Another author defines privacy as a " 'zero relationship' between two or more persons in the sense that there is no interaction or communication between them if they so choose"2 The concept is used to describe not only rights purely in the private domain between individuals but also constitutional rights against the State. The former deals with the extent to which a private citizen (which includes the media and the general public) is entitled to personal information about another individual. The latter is about the extent to which government authorities can intrude into the life of the private citizen to keep a watch over his movements through devices such as telephone-tapping or surveillance. This aspect also concerns the extent to which government authorities can exercise control over personal choices: for instance, by determining whether a pregnant woman has the right to abortion,3 or whether an HIV-infected person has the right to marry4 or have children.

III. Privacy and the right to free speech

The right to freedom of speech and expression and the right to privacy are two sides of the same coin. One person's right to know and be informed may violate another's right to be left alone. Just as the freedom of speech and expression is vital for the dissemination of information on matters of public interest, it is equally important to safeguard the private life of an individual to the extent that it is unrelated to public duties or matters of public interest. The law of privacy endeavours to balance these competing freedoms.

IV. Modern media and privacy

The development of the media in modern times has a special relevance to the evolution of the law of privacy. The media has made it possible to bring the private life of an individual into the public domain, thus exposing him to the risk of an invasion of his space and his privacy. At a time when information was not so easily accessible to the public, the risk of such an invasion was relatively remote. In India, newspapers were, for many years, the primary source of information to the public. Even they had a relatively limited impact, given that the vast majority of our population was illiterate. This has changed with a growth in public consciousness, a rise in literacy and perhaps most importantly, an explosion of visual and electronic media which have facilitated an unprecedented information revolution. Advances in computer technology and telecommunications have dramatically increased the amount of information that can be stored, retrieved, accessed and collated almost instantaneously. An enormous amount of personal information is held by various bodies, both public and private - the police, the income tax department, banks, insurance agencies, credit-rating agencies, stockbrokers, employers, doctors, lawyers, marriage bureaus, detectives, airlines, hotels and so on. Till recently, this information was held on paper; the sheer Vol. and a lack of centralization made it hard to collate with the result that it was very difficult for one body or person to use this information effectively. In the Internet age, information is so centralized and so easily accessible that one tap on a button could throw up startling amounts of information about an individual. This enables public authorities to keep a closer watch over the individual.

It doesn't end with public authorities. There are other Big Brothers watching everywhere.

— Every time you log on to the Internet you leave behind an electronic trail. Websites and advertising companies are able to track users as they travel on the Internet to assess their personal preferences, habits and lifestyles. This information is used for direct marketing campaigns that target the individual customer.5 Every time you use your credit card you leave behind a trail of where you shopped and when, what you bought, your brand preferences, your favourite restaurant.

— Employee privacy is under siege: employers routinely use software to access their employees' email and every move of the employee.6

— Field sales representatives have their movements tracked by the use of location-based tracking systems in new wireless phones.

Technology blurs the traditional boundaries between systems. Techniques such as data mining ensure that every bit of valuable information is extracted and logged. Data matching enables linkages to be made between the contents of previously uncorrelated databanks.

The move towards convergence will further blur traditional distinctions between activities, technologies and regulatory schemes. Information obtained by private agencies is used (and misused) not only by the private sector but is easily accessed by public authorities. Police and tax authorities the world over are known to rely on the private sector for information about suspects and tax evaders. Seemingly innocuous information disclosed in a specific limited environment may be collated and used in a completely unforeseen and startling context.7 Coinciding with this technological revolution, is the imminent enactment of a law on freedom of information. The Freedom of Information Bill, 1992 creates rights of access to information relating to public affairs and proceeds on a presumption in favour of openness. While the enactment of this Bill will provide for greater transparency in public life, it will also bring into confrontation the right of the public to know and the right of the individual to be left alone.

V. Technology and the law of privacy

The law on privacy has not kept pace with technological development. Even today, in no country does the right to privacy enjoy the status of a specific constitutional right. Privacy law has evolved largely through judicial pronouncement. Despite the lack of specific constitutional recognition, the right to privacy has long held a place in international documents on human rights such as Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948. Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 to which India is a signatory, reads as follows:

1. No one shall be subject to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to lawful attacks on his honour and reputation.

2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights reads as follows:

(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right, except such as is in accordance with law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety, for the prevention of disorder and crime or for the protection of health or morals.

VI. Privacy: cases in England and the U.S.A.

The American law on privacy has evolved faster than the law in England.8 One of the earliest cases in England, Albert v. Strange9 involved the unauthorised copying of etchings made by Queen Victoria and her husband for their private amusement. The etchings, which represented members of the Royal family and matters of personal interest, were entrusted to a printer for making impressions. An employee of the printer made unauthorised copies and sold them to the defendant who in turn proposed to exhibit them publicly. Prince Albert succeeded in obtaining an injunction to prevent the exhibition. The court's reasoning was based on both the enforcement of the Prince's property rights as well as the employee's breach of confidence. This case is widely regarded as having inspired the development of the law of privacy in the United States.

Even as late as 1991, the law in England was found to be inadequate in protecting privacy. In that year, the Court of appeal decided Kaye v. Robertson.10 The case concerned a well-known actor who had to be hospitalised after sustaining serious head injuries in a car accident. At a time when the actor was in no condition to be interviewed, a reporter and a photographer from the Sunday Sport newspaper unauthorisedly gained access to his hospital room, took photographs and attempted to conduct an interview with the actor. An interlocutory injunction was sought on behalf of the actor to prevent the paper from publishing the article which claimed that Kaye had agreed to give an exclusive interview to the paper. There being no right to privacy under the English law, the plaintiff could not maintain an action for breach of privacy. In the absence of such a right, the claim was based on other rights of action such as libel, malicious falsehood and trespass to the person, in the hope that one or the other would help him protect his privacy. Eventually, he was granted an injunction to restrain publication of the malicious falsehood. The publication of the story and some less objectionable photographs were, however, allowed on the condition that it was not claimed that the plaintiff had given his consent. The remedy was clearly inadequate since it failed to protect the plaintiff from preserving his personal space and from keeping his personal circumstances away from public glare. The court expressed its inability to protect the privacy of the individual and blamed the failure of common law and statute to protect this right.11

In the U.S.A., the need for a law to protect privacy was articulated as early as 1890 when an article titled "The Right to Privacy" was published by Warren and Brandeis12 This article laid the intellectual foundations for the law on privacy.

"Recent inventions and business method call attention to the next step which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for securing to the individual what Judge Cooley calls 'the right to be let alone'. Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of the home ... private devices threaten to make good the prediction that 'what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house tops'.... The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery.... The intensity and complexity of life attendant upon advancing civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become more essential to the individual; but modern enterprise and invention have through invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by bodily injury. It is our purpose to consider whether the existing law affords a principle which can properly be invoked to protect the privacy of an individual; and, if it does, what the nature and extent of such protection is...."

The most well-known American cases on privacy are Griswold v. Connecticut13 and Roe v. Wade3. In Griswold13 the constitutionality of a law which prohibited the use of contraceptives was challenged. Upholding the notion of privacy, Justice Douglas held:

"... 'governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to State regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms'. (NAACP v. Alabama14) Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship."15

Striking down the legislation as an unconstitutional invasion of the right to marital privacy, it was held that the right of freedom of speech and the press includes not only the right to utter or to print but also to distribute, receive and read and that without those peripheral rights, the specific right would be endangered.

Roe v. Wade3 dealt with the right of an unmarried pregnant woman to an abortion. Upholding the woman's right to make that choice which affected her private life, the Supreme Court held that although the American Constitution did not explicitly mention any right of privacy, the Supreme Court itself recognised such a right as a guarantee of certain "zones or areas of privacy" and "that the roots of that right may be found in the First Amendment, in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights and in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment".3

VII. The law of privacy in India

In India, the right to privacy is not a specific fundamental right but has gained constitutional recognition. Unfortunately, the right to privacy is not one of the "reasonable restrictions"16 to the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a). Article 19 reads as follows:

"19. (1) All citizens shall have the right-

(a) to freedom of speech and expression;

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*

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(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, insofar as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence."

The result of the restrictions being exhaustively enumerated is that unless a publication that invades the individual's privacy is "immoral" or "indecent" it does not fall foul of Article 19(2).

However, this lacuna has not prevented the courts from carving out a constitutional right to privacy by a creative interpretation of the right to life17 and the right to freedom of movement18

The right to privacy in India has derived itself from essentially two sources: the common law of torts and the constitutional law19 In common law, a private action for damages for unlawful invasion of privacy is maintainable. The printer and publisher of a journal, magazine or book are liable in damages if they publish any matter concerning the private life of the individual20 without such person's consent. There are two exceptions to this rule: first, that the right to privacy does not survive once the publication is a matter of public record and, second, when the publication relates to the discharge of the official duties of a public servant, an action is not maintainable unless the publication is proved to be false, malicious or is in reckless disregard for truth.

Under the constitutional law, the right to privacy is implicit in the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution21 This has been interpreted to include the right to be let alone. The constitutional right to privacy flowing from Article 21 must, however, be read together with the constitutional right to publish any matter of public interest, subject to reasonable restrictions.

The first few cases that presented the Indian Supreme Court with the opportunity to develop the law on privacy were cases of police surveillance. The Court examined the constitutional validity of legislations that empowered the police to keep a secret watch on the movements of an individual. The first of these cases, Kharak Singh v. State of U.P.22 was a challenge to the constitutional validity of Rule 236 of the U.P. Police Regulations which permitted surveillance. A majority on the Bench struck down Regulation 236(b) which authorised domiciliary visits as being unconstitutional but upheld the other provisions under that Regulation. The majority were unreceptive to the idea of recognizing a right to privacy and dismissed the claim on the ground that there could be no fundamental right to protect "mere personal sensitiveness". Their view was based on the conclusion that the infringement of a fundamental right must be both direct as well as tangible and that the freedom guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) was not infringed by a watch being kept over the movements of a suspect.

It was, however, the minority view expressed by Justice Subba Rao that laid the foundations for the development of the law in India. Justice Subba Rao held that the concept of "liberty" in Article 21 was comprehensive enough to include privacy and that a person's house, where he lives with his family is his "castle" and that nothing is more deleterious to a man's physical happiness and health than a calculated interference with his privacy. The conclusion was that surveillance by domiciliary visits and other acts under Regulation 236 was ultra vires Article 19(1)(d) and Article 21.

In Gobind v. State of M.P.23 also a case of surveillance,24 the Supreme Court appears to have acknowledged a limited right to privacy. Yet, the Court went further than Kharak Singh22 and upheld the impugned regulation which authorised domiciliary visits in its entirety. This was on the ground that the object of the provision was the prevention of crime. The Court held:

"31. Depending on the character and antecedents of the person subjected to surveillance as also the objects and the limitation under which surveillance is made, it cannot be said surveillance by domiciliary visits would always be unreasonable restriction upon the right of privacy. Assuming that the fundamental rights explicitly guaranteed to a citizen have penumbral zones and that the right to privacy is itself a fundamental right, that fundamental right must be subject to restriction on the basis of compelling public interest. As Regulation 856 has the force of law, it cannot be said that the fundamental right of the petitioner under Article 21 has been violated by the provisions contained in it: for, what is guaranteed under that article is that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except by the procedure established by 'law'."25

But the Court could not help express its discomfort with the provisions when it observed:

"Domiciliary visits and picketing by the police should be reduced to the clearest cases of danger to community security and not routine follow-up at the end of a conviction or release from prison or at the whim of a police officer. In truth, legality apart, these regulations ill-accord with the essence of personal freedoms and the State will do well to revise these old police regulations verging perilously near unconstitutionality."26

In Malak Singh v. State of P&H27 the constitutionality of police powers of surveillance, under the Police Act and the Punjab Police Rules was challenged. The Court upheld the regulations that authorised surveillance for the prevention of crime and justified the maintenance of "history sheets" and surveillance registers as confidential documents. It did observe that surveillance of persons who did not fall within the category mentioned under the impugned regulation, or for reasons unconnected with prevention of crime or excessive surveillance would entitle a citizen to the protection of the Court. But the law on privacy was taken no further.

The Supreme Court touched upon the rights of the individual to privacy vis-a-vis invasions by journalists in Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra28, Prabha Dutt v. Union of India29 and also recently in State through Supdt., Central Jail, N.D. v. Charulata Joshi30 In all these cases journalists sought permission from the Court to interview and photograph prisoners. Although the issue of privacy was not directly dealt with, the Court implicitly acknowledged the right to privacy by holding that the press had no absolute right to interview or photograph a prisoner but could do so only with his consent31

R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N.32 is a watershed in the development of the Indian law of privacy. For the first time, the Supreme Court discussed the right to privacy in the context of the freedom of the press. The case concerned the right of the publisher of a magazine to publish the autobiography of the condemned prisoner, "Auto Shankar". The respondents contended that the intended publication (which was to expose some sensational links between the police authorities and the criminal) was likely to be defamatory and therefore required to be restrained. The issue of the right to privacy came up in this context. The Supreme Court held that the press had the right to publish what they claimed was the autobiography of Auto Shankar insofar as it appeared from the public records, even without his consent or authorisation. However, if the press items went beyond the public record and published his life story, that might amount to an invasion of his right to privacy. Similarly, the government and prison officials who sought to protect themselves against possible defamation (by ostensibly seeking to protect the privacy of the incarcerated prisoner), did not have the right to impose a prior restraint on the publication of the autobiography; their remedy, if at all, could arise only after the publication.

The Court recognised two aspects of the right to privacy: (1) the tortious law of privacy which affords an action for damages resulting from an unlawful invasion of privacy, and (2) the constitutional right "to be let alone" implicit in the right to life and liberty under Article 21. A citizen has the right to safeguard his own privacy, that of his family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, child-bearing, education etc. and no person can publish anything relating to such matters without the consent of the person concerned. The Court acknowledged two exceptions to this rule: first, where the matter has become a matter of public record, the right to privacy no longer subsists.33 Second, public officials are not entitled to claim privacy when the act or conduct in question relates to the discharge of their official duties. Even where the publication is based upon facts found to be untrue, the public official is not entitled to protection unless it is shown that the publication was made with reckless disregard for truth. It is sufficient for the publisher to show that he acted after a reasonable verification of facts.

VIII. Recent cases in India

Privacy-related issues have recently cropped up in a variety of cases, ranging from biographical films to telephone-tapping to the right of confidentiality of an HIV-infected person.

In Kaleidoscope (India)(P) Ltd. v. Phoolan Devi34 the trial Judge restrained the exhibition of the controversial film Bandit Queen both in India and abroad. The trial court reached a prima facie view that the film infringed the right to privacy of Phoolan Devi, notwithstanding that she had assigned her copyright in her writings to the film producers. This was upheld by the Division Bench. The Court observed that even assuming that Phoolan Devi was a public figure whose private life was exposed to the media, the question was to what extent private matters relating to rape or the alleged murders committed by her could be commercially exploited, and not just as news items or matters of public interest.

People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India35 involved a challenge to Section 5(2) of the Telegraph Act, 1885 which permits the interception of messages in cases of public emergency or in the interest of public safety. The Supreme Court held that the right to privacy, which was part of the fundamental right to life guaranteed under Article 21, included the right to hold a telephone conversation in the privacy of one's home or office. It was held that telephone-tapping, a form of "technological eavesdropping" infringed the right to privacy. Finding that the Government had failed to lay down a proper procedure under Section 7(2)(b) of the Act to ensure procedural safeguards against the misuse of the power under Section 5(2), the Court prescribed stringent measures to protect the individual's privacy to the extent possible.

Does the disclosure by a hospital of the medical condition of an AIDS patient to his fianc‚e amount to a breach of the patient's privacy? This question arose in Mr 'X' v. Hospital 'Y'.4 The Supreme Court was confronted with the task of striking a balance between two conflicting fundamental rights: the AIDS patient's right to life which included his right to privacy and confidentiality of his medical condition, and the right of the lady to whom he was engaged to lead a healthy life. The Supreme Court concluded that since the life of the fianc‚e would be endangered by her marriage and consequent conjugal relations with the AIDS victim, she was entitled to information regarding the medical condition of the man she was to marry. There was, therefore, no infringement of the right to privacy.36

This case may be compared with the English case, X v. Y37, from the late eighties. A newspaper reporter acquired information about two doctors practising in the National Health Service despite having AIDS. The information was acquired from hospital records and was supplied by employees of NHS. Despite the plaintiffs having obtained an injunction against the use of any confidential information from hospital records, the second defendants, owners of a national newspaper published an article written by the defendant reporter titled "Scandal of Docs with AIDS" and threatened to disclose the identity of the doctors. While recognizing the public interest in having a free press and informed public debate, the Court took the view that this was outweighed by the public interest that victims of AIDS should be able to resort to hospitals without fear of disclosure and breach of confidence by employees of the hospital. The Court felt that a breach of confidentiality would make patients reluctant to come forward for treatment and counselling and this, in turn, would lead to a spread of the disease, which was contrary to public interest. Even over ten years before the X v. Y37 type of case arose before the Supreme Court in India, the English Court showed far more zealousness in protecting the privacy of AIDS victims.

IX. Privacy under siege

In an age of revolutionized communications, privacy is clearly under siege but lawmakers have shown scarce concern on the issue. While in many other countries, there are now a variety of statutes in place38 that seek to protect these rights, Indian laws on the subject lag far behind.

In fact, the attitude of legislators and the executive has been rather regressive. Recently, the Government launched another onslaught on privacy by issuing an advertisement pertaining to the Foreigners' (Report to Police) Order, 1971 made under the Foreigners Act, 1946, making it obligatory for all persons to inform the police about the arrival in his house or premises of a foreigner. This could have preposterous results. It could even mean that if your NRI relation, the details of whose status you may be unaware of, comes visiting, and you do not inform the police of his arrival, you may find yourself behind bars for up to five years39

So far the law of privacy has been relegated to a penumbral status and has never enjoyed the status of a well-defined right. It is time our lawmakers enacted laws to protect privacy rather than laws that license intrusion into private affairs. At the same time, it is also necessary to preserve the tenuous balance between the right of the individual to be let alone and the fundamental right to free speech, expression and information.

*   Advocate, High Court, Mumbai. Return to Text

1. Adam Carlyle Breckenridge: The Right to Privacy, 1971. Return to Text
2. Edward Shils, "Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes", Law and Contemporary Problems 31, No. 2 (Spring 1966). Return to Text
3. Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113 (1973). Return to Text
4. Mr 'X' v. Hospital 'Z', (1998) 8 SCC 296. Return to Text
5. Cookies versus new technology. Return to Text
6. Recently, a powerful PC surveillance software called e-Blaster was launched in India. For as little as Rs 3500, this software can stealthily record everything that spouses, children or employees do on their PCs and send a report to a specified email address anywhere in the world. STARR (Stealth Activity Recorder and Reporter), available from iopus.com, is a popular software that, as its very name suggests, stealthily monitors and records all computer activity by users on a network or even by multiple users on a single PC. This information is logged. Return to Text
7. For instance, in the United States of America, the Selective Service System is reported to have purchased a list of 1,67,000 names of boys who had responded to a promotion organised by Ben & Jerry, a chain of ice cream parlours offering free ice cream on the occasion of their 18th birthday. This list of names, addresses and dates of birth was used to track down those who had failed to register for military service. Return to Text
8. Ironically, it was by borrowing from the English case-law and creatively interpreting it that the law in America developed. And yet, the law of privacy in England has lagged far behind, inviting serious criticism from commentators. Return to Text
9. (1849) 1 Mac & G 25 : 41 ER 1171 Return to Text
10. (1991) FSR 62 Return to Text
11. Hopefully, the Human Rights Act in 1998 which imposes a positive obligation to act in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights will have a positive effect on the development of the law in the U.K. Return to Text
12. 4 Harv L Rev 193 Return to Text
13. 381 US 479 (1965) Return to Text
14. 377 US 288, 307 (1964) Return to Text
15. 381 US 479, 486 (1965) Return to Text
16. Article 19(2) Return to Text
17. Article 21 Return to Text
18. Article 19(1)(g) Return to Text
19. There are also a few statutory provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure Section 327(1), the Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1980 (Sections 3 and 4), the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 Section 7(1)(c), the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (Section 22), the Special Marriages Act, 1954 (Section 33), the Children Act, 1960 (Section 36), and the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 (Section 36), all of which seek to protect women and children from unwarranted publicity. Return to Text
20. This would include his family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, child-bearing, education etc. Return to Text
21. R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N., (1994) 6 SCC 632. Return to Text
22. AIR 1963 SC 1295 Return to Text
23. (1975) 2 SCC 148 Return to Text
24. Under the Madhya Pradesh Police Regulations. Return to Text
25. (1975) 2 SCC 148, pp. 157-58, para 31. Return to Text
26. (1975) 2 SCC 148, p. 158, para 33. Return to Text
27. (1981) 1 SCC 420 Return to Text
28. (1987) 4 SCC 373 Return to Text
29. (1982) 1 SCC 1 Return to Text
30. (1999) 4 SCC 65 Return to Text
31. These cases are important because they endeavour to strike a balance between the public's right to know and the privacy of the individual. Return to Text
32. "Auto Shankar" case, (1994) 6 SCC 632. Return to Text
33. Except in the interests of decency. Return to Text
34. AIR 1995 Del 316 Return to Text
35. (1997) 1 SCC 301 Return to Text
36. Interestingly, although the identity of the parties was concealed, a law journal which first reported the judgment disclosed the names of the parties. This was subsequently rectified by the publication of an apology and the rectification of names. But the damage to the privacy of those concerned had already been done. Return to Text
37. (1988) 2 All ER 648 Return to Text
38. Such as the Privacy Act, 1988 (Commonwealth) and the Data Protection Act, 1988 in the U.K. Return to Text
39. Mercifully, this directive was withdrawn in September 2001. Return to Text