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The Supreme Court's Judgment in Babul Mitra's Case
by Devaprasad Chaudhuri
Cite as : (1973) 1 SCC (Jour) 13
In the case of Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal,1 (a case under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950) the Supreme Court of India stated, "It is now well established that even if any one of the grounds or reasons that led to the satisfaction is irrelevant, the order of detention would be invalid even if there were other relevant grounds, because it can never be certain to what extent the bad reasons operated on the mind of the authority concerned or whether the detention order would have been made at all if only one or two good reasons had been before them." In the case of Babul Mitra v. State of West Bengal,2 (a case under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971) the material portions of the grounds of detention were as follows:
"You are detained on the ground that you have been acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order as evidence by the particulars given below, taken separately and collectively:
(1) On April 16, 1971 at about 11.00 hours you along with Sri Barun Choudhury of Debingar, Police Station Moynaguri and others forced into Moynaguri Higher Secondary School, Moyanguri, prevented the school staff from giving you any resistance with threat of violence and set fire to the school building. As a result of arson caused by you the school had to be closed sine die.
(2) On June 29, 1971 at about 22.00 hours police arrested you at Debingar, Police Station Moynaguri with a bomb in your hand. You also made attempt to throw the bomb on the Police personnel at the time of your arrest with a view to killing them."
The detenu's learned advocate argued that the grounds of detention are not concerned with 'public order'. The Supreme Court considered the first ground of detention 'separately' and held the same to be connected with public order. The Supreme Court considered the second ground of detention in the following manner:
"It may be recalled that in the preamble to the grounds of detention it is stated that he has been acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order as evidence by the grounds 'taken separately and collectively'. So it would be legitimate to assess the community impact of the second ground in the background of the first ground . . . . The two grounds read together, disclose the petitioner's concerted scheme of making public institutions and public servants the target of his violence. This scheme sheds light on the potentiality of the second ground. The activity specified in the second ground is bound to affect public order." The Supreme Court did not consider the relevance of the second ground "separately" but only "collectively" with the first ground of detention. The net result is that the first ground of detention read "separately" was held to be connected with public order and the second ground of detention not read "separately", but read "collectively" with the first ground was held to be connected with public order.
The "well-established" law reaffirmed in Pushkar Mukherjee case has always been understood by the Bench and the Bar (and quite reasonably so) as laying down that, if one ground of detention is bad the order of detention is bad. Naturally, in considering the legality of a detention the courts (including the Supreme Court) have so long tested the grounds of detention "separately". The Supreme Court's approach in Babul Mitra case of testing one ground "separately" and the other ground "collectively" is thus a departure from the "well-established" law reiterated in Pushkar Mukherjee case. What appears to be unfortunate in Babul Mitra case is the Supreme Court's express reliance on the words "taken separately and collectively" for arriving at the result it does.
If the Supreme Court was in fact relying on the words "taken separately and collectively" in the preamble to the grounds of detention, it should have tested the connection (i.e. relevance) of each ground "taken separately" with public order. The Supreme Court tested the first ground "taken separately" but not the second ground but yet it expressly relied upon the words "taken separately and collectively" for its mode of approach. This mode of approach is not justified by the grammatical meaning of the words "taken separately and collectively". The addition of the words "taken separately and collectively" in the preamble to the grounds of detention means that the satisfaction of the detaining authority has been reached after considering each ground separately and also taking all the grounds together. In a case where there are two grounds of detention, if each ground "taken separately" is good, both the grounds "taken collectively" cannot be bad. But if one ground or all the grounds "taken separately" is or are found to be bad, it is difficult to see how the words "taken separately and collectively" can save the order of detention. The words "taken separately and collectively" do not mean "if not separately then collectively" nor do they mean "no matter whether separately but collectively". Even assuming that the words "taken separately and collectively", are amenable to such construction, the order of detention ought to fail on the ground that the detaining authority is uncertain in its own mind.
Those who deal with cases under the laws of preventive detention know that the words "taken separately and collectively" are nowadays added by the detaining authorities in the belief that they would thereby counteract the decisions of the Courts holding that if one ground is bad, the detention is bad. The device has apparently succeeded.
In view of the "well-established" law restated by the Supreme Court in Pushkar Mukherjee case, one would have thought that the words "taken separately and collectively" added to the preamble to the grounds of detention, did not improve the cause of the detaining authorities, and their addition was useless. Does Babul Mitra case unsettle the law which we had so long known as settled?
- (1969) 1 SCC 10.
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- (1973) 1 SCC 393.
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