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Precedent and Judicial Legislation in the Application of Taxing Statutes *
Cite as : (1989) 3 SCC (Jour) 1
There was a teacher of advaita philosophy living in a forest settlement, who had not acquired complete mastery over the subject he was teaching, but had only a smattering of it. He was fond of repeating before his students that everything in this world was maya or an illusion and nobody need take serious notice of anything. One day as he was teaching he noticed that a tiger was moving towards the school. Suddenly he ran away from the place for safety. The students also ran away from the place. When they found that the tiger had changed its mind and moved away from the school, the teacher and the students reassembled at the school. One mischievous student then asked the teacher as to why the teacher ran away from the place, when what was moving towards the school was not really a tiger but a mere illusion as according to the teacher himself everything was 'maya'. The teacher who was a clever guy, replied that even his running was an illusion or maya and one need not worry about it. A mischievous question elicited an equally mischievous reply.
The subject of today's lecture raises the same question as to the dichotomy that exists between a false appearance and reality. The question is whether the courts while deciding tax cases should go by the appearance of the transactions or by their reality in determining the liability of an assessee.
Taxes are levied by the legislature of a country to meet the expenditure which the Government has to incur to run the administration. In a police State whose functions are very few, the governmental spending would be the least unless the Government has embarked upon any war or there is an internal disturbance. But in a welfare State, particularly in a largely populated developing country, like ours, the government expenditure is enormous and it becomes necessary for the legislature to harness every available avenue to collect the amount needed every year. Very often the Government which is unable to control its expenditure but at the same time unable to raise all the funds needed by taxation may have even to resort to deficit financing, the consequences of which may sometimes be quite disastrous if the amount spent is not able to produce the desired effect. Hence it is necessary that the Government should as far as possible try to balance its budget by raising sufficient revenue to meet its demands. The budget is always based on estimates and the estimates are based on several assumptions, one of them being that everybody who is liable to pay taxes pays it honestly and does not resort to subterfuges just for the sake of reducing the liability. It is no doubt true that whenever the legislature finds that people try to evade taxes by resorting to such contrivances in a large scale, it amends the law suitably so that even those who had resorted to such contrivances come within the net of taxation. But by the time such contrivances come to the knowledge of the Government, and appropriate legislative action is taken, several years would have passed and the budget that is passed for a particular year would have suffered an imbalance resulting in an unexpected financial disequilibrium. In the meanwhile as the actual receipts had fallen short of the estimated receipts, the shortfall would have to be made good by either borrowing or by resorting to additional taxation. The result is that honest taxpayers suffer, and the dishonest continue to enjoy the benefit of tax evasion. The tax evaders just do not bother about any increase in the taxes that are levied since they have just not to pay anything. The developmental activities of the State also suffer a setback on account of constant financial stringency felt by the Exchequer. Any appeal based on morality is just brushed aside by tax advisers who cling to the oft-quoted dictum of Rowlatt, J. that there is no equity in a tax and argue that unless a transaction squarely falls in its form within the measure of taxation, it is out of the net of taxation, irrespective of what it is in reality or in other words its substance. They argue that the Court which has to decide the tax cases should look to the form and never to the substance of a transaction and any attempt to deviate from that rule and to look at the substance of the transaction to decide upon the tax liability of an assessee would amount to judicial legislation not warranted by law. There is however a moderate school of lawyers who say that there is a difference between tax avoidance and tax evasion. According to them those assessees who try to arrange their affairs in a manner as would expose them to lesser liability of tax by entering into genuine tax planning measures should not be penalised by ignoring such transactions. What they do is termed as just tax avoidance but not tax evasion which is the result of non-disclosure of transactions, suppression of accounts, etc. Experience has shown that the difference between tax avoidance and tax evasion is very thin. We may refer to some of the methods of so-called tax avoidance resorted to by the assessees to some of which Lord Oliver has made reference to in his learned lecture. The American view is expressed in Helvering v. Clifford1, which was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States of America. In that case the taxpayer had settled some property on trust with a direction that the income therefrom should go to his wife for a period of five years and then the property should revert to the author of the trust, i.e. himself. He appointed himself as a trustee with wide powers of management. He questioned his liability to pay tax on the income on the ground that it did not fall within the definition of income under Section 61. He failed before the Supreme Court which inter alia held:
"The broad sweep of this language indicates the purpose of Congress to use the full measure of its taxing power within those definable categories .... Hence our construction of the statute should be consonant with that purpose. Technical considerations, niceties of the law of trusts or conveyances, or the legal paraphernalia which inventive genius may construct as a refuge from surtaxes should not obscure the basic issue. That issue is whether the grantor after the trust has been established may still be treated, under this statutory scheme, as the owner of the corpus. See Blair v. Commissioner2 In absence of more precise standards or guides supplied by the statute or appropriate regulations, the answer to that question must depend on an analysis of the terms of the trust and all the circumstances attendant on its creation and operation. And where the grantor is the trustee and the beneficiaries are members of his family group, special scrutiny of the arrangement is necessary lest what is in reality but one economic unit be multiplied into two or more devices which, though valid under State law, are not conclusive so far as Section 61(a) is concerned.
In this case we cannot conclude as a matter of law that respondent ceased to be the owner of the corpus as far as the trust was created. Rather, the short duration of the trust, the fact that the wife was the beneficiary, and the retention of control over the corpus by the respondent all lead irresistibly to the conclusion that respondent continued to be the owner for purposes of Section 61(a).
So far as his dominion and control were concerned it seems clear that the trust did not effect any substantial change. In substance his control over the corpus was in all essential respects the same after the trust was created, as before...."
Here the Supreme Court of the United States of America virtually ignored the creation of the trust altogether and treated the income from the property in question as the income of the assessee himself instead of holding that the income should be deemed to be that of the assessee as had been done in England in similar circumstances by an amendment of law. Subsequently in America there has been a legislation which treats the income from such trust properties as the income of the author of the trust in certain circumstances, thus putting an end to the necessity of the court determining the true nature of the transaction. But it was however clear that the method adopted by the assessee in the above case was a deliberate attempt to evade the tax.
It appears that there was a provision in the U.S. tax law which imposed a higher tax in the aggregate on married couples and the crucial date for determining the status for purposes of levy of tax was the end of the year. This led to a number of divorces in December and subsequent remarriages in the following January. Lessen Boyter v. Commissioner3, deals with one such divorce. The cases which have arisen on both sides of the Atlantic and which have led to misuse of the provision permitting the deduction of interest from gross income subject to certain restrictions are Cairns v. MacDiarmid4, Ridge Securities Ltd. v. I.R.C. 5 and Goldstein v. Commissioner6 In the last of these cases, i.e., Goldstein case6 the facts were these. The taxpayer had won $ 140,000 in the Irish Sweepstake; windfall winnings of this sort were income under the United States tax law. She then borrowed virtually $ 1 million to buy United States Treasury notes of a slightly higher face value repayable in a few years; the notes were pledged to the bank as security and she prepaid $ 81,000 in interest. The purpose was to reduce the income in the year of the Sweepstake success and to take its economic equivalent in later years as the notes matured; there was the further bonus that what was received on maturity might be capital gain rather than income. The real saving would come from the mitigation of the progressive tax rates. In withholding the benefit of the deduction the court stated that Section 163(a)
"should not be construed to permit an interest deduction when it objectively appears that a taxpayer has borrowed funds in order to engage in a transaction that has no substance or purpose aside from the taxpayer's desire to obtain the benefit of an interest deduction; and a good example of such purposeless activity is the borrowing of funds at 4 per cent in order to purchase property that returns less than 2 per cent and holds out no prospect of appreciation sufficient to counter the unfavourable interest rate differential."
Then we have the 'bed and breakfast' transactions which are entered into solely with the purpose of gaining a tax advantage. Here a taxpayer sells his stock on April 1 and buys it back the next day and thereby gains or loses as the case may be to suit his purpose. The next type of tax avoidance cases are those of limited partnerships which came up for consideration in Reed v. Young7, to which I believe Lord Oliver was a party. They are cases in which the limited partners were not liable for the liabilities of the partnership beyond the amount of capital contributed by them but each was entitled to a share of profits or losses incurred. In Reed v. Young7, the partnership suffered a loss in the first year itself and the assessee who was a limited partner tried to set the loss incurred by him which was more than the capital contributed by him against his general income under Section 168 of the Taxes Act, 1970. The Revenue did not allow it as according to it the assessee could not have really sustained a loss over and above the capital contributed by him. But the House of Lords upheld the plea of the assessee rejecting the plea of the Revenue on the ground that the partnerships trading losses were conceptually quite distinct from the debts and liabilities of the firm and from the assets which were available to meet them. I have given these cases to illustrate how by clever planning it is possible to get over the liability even though quite often the methods adopted appear to be disingenuous indeed.
In Duke of Westminster v. I.R.C.8, the question whether the court has power to overlook the form and look to the substance came into focus clearly. I need not State the facts of that case as they are stated by Lord Oliver already. I may however refer to the observations of Lord Russel in that case which are very instructive. Lord Russel observed:
"The Commissioners and Finlay, J. took the opposite view on the ground that, as they said, looking at the substance of the thing the payments were payments of wages. This simply means that the true legal position is disregarded and a different legal right and liability substituted in the place of the legal right and liability which the parties have created. I confess that I view with disfavour the doctrine that in taxation cases the subject is to be taxed if, in accordance with a court's view of what it considers the substance of the transaction, the court thinks that the case falls within the contemplation or spirit of the statute. The subject is not taxable by inference or by analogy, but only by the plain words of a statute applicable to the facts and circumstances of his case.... If all that is meant by the doctrine is that having once ascertained the legal rights of the parties you may disregard mere nomenclature and decide the question of taxability or non-taxability in accordance with the legal rights, well and good.... If, on the other hand, the doctrine means that you may brush aside deeds, disregard the legal rights and liabilities arising under a contract between parties and decide questions of taxability or non-taxability upon the footing of the rights and liabilities of the parties being different from what in law they are, then I entirely dissent from such a doctrine."
Since the above case was decided nearly half a century has elapsed. There have been changes in judicial approach to tax laws. There have been judges who have been thinking that few pieces of paper and little ink used in the adoption of a scheme with the sole purpose of defeating a tax law and not in the ordinary course of business ought not to assist an assessee to escape from the liability to pay the taxes legitimately due from him and place him at an advantageous position when compared with other taxpayers who do not indulge in such schemes. When it is said that there is no equity in taxes it does not mean that the court should shut its eyes to the question of genuineness of the transactions. By entering into certain fake transactions which are not intended to take effect but which are only to be used to deny the tax due to the Exchequer, the taxpayer concerned is only taking advantage of a facade created by him to deny what is due to the Government. Why should he be allowed to do so? Why should the maxim that equity looks to the intention and not to the form, if it can be applied in the case of many other legal transactions involving property, not be made applicable at least in a modified form to cases arising under tax laws is the question which has been worrying many.
There have been since the Duke of Westminster case8 a number of decisions on the point in issue.
During the war years in England a marked shift in emphasis became perceptible. In 1942 Lord Greene, M.R. in 25 Tax Cas. 121 at p. 134 struck a different note:
"For years a battle of manoeuvre has been waged between the legislature and those who are minded to throw the burden of taxation off their own shoulders on to those of their fellow subjects.
...it would not shock us in the least to find that the legislature has determined to put an end to the struggle by imposing the severest of penalties. It scarcely lies in the mouth of the taxpayer who plays with fire to complain of burnt fingers."
In Latilla v. I.R.C.9, Viscount Simon, L.C. said:
"... there is, of course, no doubt that they are within their legal rights, but that is no reason why their efforts, or those of the professional gentlemen who assist them in the matter, should be regarded as a commendable exercise of ingenuity or as a discharge of the duties of good citizenship."
But after the war in Lord Vestey's Executors v. I.R.C.10, there was a swing back. Lord Normand said:
"Tax avoidance is an evil, but it would be the beginning of much greater evils if the courts were to overstretch the language of the statute in order to subject to taxation people of whom they disapproved."
Lord Upjohn in 1967 in I.R.C. v. Brebner11, said:
"No commercial man in his senses is going to carry out commercial transactions except upon the footing of paying the smallest amount of tax involved."
But there were at the same time hints of recognition of the need for a purposive construction:
Lord Reid in Gartside v. I.R.C.12, said:
"It is always proper to construe an ambiguous word or phrase in light of the mischief which the provision is obviously designed to prevent, and in light of the reasonableness of the consequences which follow from giving it a particular construction."
Later, in Greenberg v. I.R.C.13, Lord Reid said:
"We seem to have travelled a long way from the general and salutary rule that the subject is not to be taxed except by plain words. But I must recognise that plain words are seldom adequate to anticipate and forestall the multiplicity of ingenious schemes which are constantly being devised to evade taxation. Parliament is very properly determined to prevent this kind of tax evasion, and if the courts find it impossible to give very wide meanings to general phrases the only alternative may be for Parliament to do as some other countries have done and introduce legislation of a more sweeping character, which will put the ordinary well-intentioned person at much greater risk than is created by a wide interpretation of such provisions as those which we are now considering."
But again, Lord Simon of Glaisdale cautioned that the "Golden and straight metewand of the Law" should not be substituted by the "uncertain and crooked cord of discretion". The learned Judge observed:
"In some fiscal system there is a general provision that any transaction the paramount object of which is the avoidance of tax shall be void for that purpose though valid for all other purposes. Our own fiscal system has no such provision, but rather attempts to deal with tax avoidance schemes specifically as they come to notice."
.... It may seem hard that a cunningly advised taxpayer should be able to avoid what appears to be his equitable share of the general fiscal burden and cast it on the shoulders of his fellow citizens. But for the courts to try to stretch the law to meet hard cases (whether the hardship appears to bear on the individual taxpayer or on the general body of taxpayers as represented by the Inland Revenue) is not merely to make bad law but to run the risk of subverting the rule of law itself."
Let me refer to the echoes of this sentiment in Indian courts to give the "break" to the taxpayer.
In A.V. Fernandez v. State of Kerala14, our Supreme Court said:
"In construing fiscal statutes and in determining the liability of a subject to tax, one must have regard to the strict letter of the law and not merely to the spirit to the statute or the substance of the law.... No tax can be imposed by reference or by analogy or by trying to probe into the intentions of the legislature and by considering what was the substance of the matter."(emphasis supplied)
In C.I.T. v. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd.15, the Supreme Court observed:
"If the words of a taxing statute fail, then so must the tax. The courts cannot, except rarely in clear cases, help the draftsmen by a favourable construction." (emphasis supplied)
I.R.C. v. Plumer16, was, I think, an interesting stage, or the beginning of the end, of the Westminster principle. Though the Revenue lost, the Court distinctly saw the attractions of the argument of the Revenue if it were possible to disregard the legal form of the documents and to look beyond them for an underlying substance. The distinguishability between Form and Substance became recognised. But though the argument was rejected, Westminster case8 was not mentioned by name. The taxpayer's arrangement was upheld on the ground — that there was commercial reality in the arrangement. But the shape of things to come in W.T. Ramsay Ltd. v. I.R.C.17, was foreshadowed in Floor v. Davis18
In Ramsay case1717, the "tailor-made" or "off-the-shelf" tax avoidance packages came for a strict judicial scrutiny. Even though each transaction in the scheme could not be called "sham", they would not be saved if the sole object was "tax-avoidance". Purely artificial devices were not to be countenanced. Lord Wilberforce said:
"While the techniques of tax avoidance progress and are technically improved, the courts are not obliged to stand still. Such immobility must result either in loss of tax, to the prejudice of other taxpayers, or to parliamentary congestion or (most likely) to both. To force the courts to adopt, in relation to closely integrated situations, a step by step, dissecting, approach ... would be a denial rather than an affirmation of the true judicial process."
The Westminster9 principle was modified. Lord Diplock, in the later case of I.R.C. v. Burmah Oil Co. Ltd.19, said that it would be disingenuous to suggest and dangerous on the part of those who advised elaborate tax-avoidance schemes to assume that Ramsay17 did not mark a significant change in the judicial approach to taxation. Lord Scarman pointed out the "utmost importance" for the business community and their advisers to appreciate this change. Taxing laws thus were not outside purposive construction. Lord Wilberforce said in Ramsay17:
"There may, indeed should, be considered the context and scheme of the relevant Act as a whole, and its purpose may, indeed should, be regarded ...."
In another context, Lord Templeman in Street v. Mountford20, in the House of Lords reminded that:
"Courts should be astute to detect and frustrate sham devices and artificial transactions whose only object was to disguise the grant of tenancy and to evade the rent Act."
Ramsay17 was an exercise in a judicial reinterpretation of the existing laws to suit the changing conditions in the United Kingdom and the recognition of the principle that laws cannot be construed in vacuum and that they should be construed consistent with the requirements of the society for which they are made. The Law Lords who decided Ramsay17 may have reasonably thought that the earlier views were erroneous. This exercise cannot be equated with judicial legislation as such. It is just a reinterpretation. The House of Lords noticed the argument against the propriety in the court changing the law:
"...to accept the Revenue's wide contention involved a rejection of accepted and established canons and that if so general an attack upon schemes for tax avoidance as the Revenue suggest is to be validated that is a matter for Parliament. The function of the courts is to apply strictly and correctly the legislation which Parliament has enacted. If the taxpayer escapes the charge it is for Parliament if it disapproves of the result to close the gap."
But Lord Wilberforce said:
"I have full respect for the principles which have been stated but I do not consider that they should exclude the approach for which the Crown contends. That does not introduce a new principle. It would be to apply to new and sophisticated legal devices the undoubted power and duty of the courts to determine their nature in law and to relate them to existing legislation. While the techniques of tax avoidance progress and technically improve the courts are not obliged to stand still. Such immobility must result in loss of tax to the prejudice of other taxpayers or to parliamentary congestion or most likely to both."
But these exercises in judiciary-law have, as Lord Roskill said, not passed without criticism and the court decision of the House of Lords in Furniss v. Dawson21, has "added some fuel to the fire".
We may notice the answers to these critics. Sir Garfield Barwick in Judiciary Law: Some Observations Thereon (Current Legal Problems 1980) said:
"Even in the area of statutory interpretation, if the legislature's language leaves room, the judiciary, by assuming as it should that the legislature does not intend to lay down a rule unacceptable to the community's sense of fairness and justice and its reasonable attitude in the mutual relationship of its members, can be expected to adopt that interpretation which conforms or most nearly conforms to those community attitudes. It can never be the function of the judiciary to express views on what the law should be, irrespective of whether or not as so expressed it is conformable to the community's sense of fairness and justice. That the judiciary are to declare what the law is and not what it is not but ought to be is, in this sense, axiomatic. Thus it is not for the individual judge or judges to express his or their own views as the law, views perhaps tinged by a philosophy of one kind or another. Such a course would, it seems to me, be a complete deviation from the judicial tradition of the common law. It would lead to a rule by men rather than a rule by law: personal idiosyncrasy would overlay the reasonable consensus of the community. As the judiciary is non-elective, it would bring the judiciary itself into jeopardy. It may be said that it is only to the extent that the judiciary accurately discerns and expresses the community sense of fairness and justice that the community will, in the long run, accept what is expounded and laid down by a judiciary not responsible to an electorate. Rules which are unacceptable in that sense are, in the long run, unenforceable."
Lord Roskill in Law Lords, Reactionaries or Reformers (Current Legal Problems 1984: p. 247) said:
".... Look more recently at Ramsay's case where the House of Lords finally, but clearly, shook off the shackles of the old tax avoidance cases and hit firmly on the head certain "off-the-shelf" tax avoidances schemes.
In our Supreme Court Chinnappa Reddy, J. following Ramsay case17 in McDowell v. Commercial Tax Officer22, held:
"We think that time has come for us to depart from the Westminster principle as emphatically as the British Courts have done.... In our view, the proper way to construe a taxing statute, while considering a device to avoid tax, is not to ask whether the provisions should be construed literally or liberally, nor whether the transaction is not unreal and not prohibited by the statute, but whether the transaction is a device to avoid tax, and whether the transaction is such that the judicial process may accord its approval to it."
In the same case Ranganath Misra, J. said:23
"Tax planning may be legitimate provided it is within the framework of law. Colourable devices cannot be part of tax planning and it is wrong to encourage or entertain the belief that it is honourable to avoid the payment of tax by resorting to dubious methods. It is the obligation of every citizen to pay the taxes honestly without resorting to subterfuges."
Then came Sherdley v. Sherdley24, where an application by a custodial-parent for an order under Section 23(1)(d) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973 for a 'periodical payment order' for school fees came to be granted. The sole purpose, as found by the Court of appeal, was avoidance of tax. The effect of such an order would make the sums the separate income of the children and reduce to that extent the taxable income of the father. The Judge of the Family Division and the Court of appeal declined the order; the latter on the additional ground that the court would not make such an order, if the proposed arrangement amounted to a sham or had the sole purpose of avoiding tax liability. The House of Lords allowed the father's appeal, distinguishing both Ramsay case17 and Furniss case21.
Lord Brandon of Oakbrook allowed the 'payments order' under Section 23(1)(d) as, according to the learned Lord, a denial would bring about an unjustifiable discrimination between families which, following the breakdown of the marriage, happen to be divided, because it is for the welfare of the children, in two different but comparable ways. As to Ramsay v.I.R.C.17 and Furniss v. Dawson21 it was observed:
"With great respect to the Court of appeal, however, I cannot agree with its view that it would be wrong for the court to make the order sought because its sole purpose is to obtain tax advantages."
".... As I indicated earlier, Sir John Donaldson, M.R. and Neill, L.J. supported the conclusion to which they came on this matter by reference to the principles stated by Your Lordships' House in W.T. Ramsay Ltd.v.I.R.C.17 and Furniss (Inspector of Taxes) v. Dawson21. As to that, I would only say that I do not regard those principles as in any way applicable to the exercise by the court of the powers conferred on it by Section 23(1)(d) of the 1973 Act.
".... I recognise the force of the critical comments made by Sir John Donaldson MR on the artificiality of contracts entered into by young children with the schools which they attend. Like Neill and Balcombe, L.JJ., however, I do not accept that an order of the court which contemplates is a sham in the legal sense of that term."
I feel that the test adopted by Sir John Donaldson M.R. in Sherdley v. Sherdley25, which is no doubt now reversed by the House of Lords in 1987 S.T.C. 217, i.e. the reality of the transaction principle or the end-result theory appears to be a reasonable view to take to avoid the effect of transactions which were never intended to take effect. It is true that law should not be made uncertain by leaving the existence of the liability only to the sweet will of the judges. But it is better than leaving it to the sweet will of the assessee who is personally interested in the case and his technical advisers who invent some incredible schemes to bring into existence an unnatural screen against liability.
Friends, I have been too legalistic. I have just dealt with the shifting judicial approach to problems of taxation. All this became necessary since we find many are trying to dodge taxes. The higher the rate of taxation the higher are the number of evasions. Perhaps if the people feel that all that is paid by way of taxes is not frittered away on unproductive adventures but is ploughed back to developmental work, the taxpayers may have the consolation that they were not losing much by paying taxes. Our ancient concept of taxation is to be found in Raghuvamsa of Kalidasa. Describing the life of King Dilipa Kalidasa says:
It was for the welfare of his subjects alone that he (Dilipa) collected taxes from them. In this he resembled the Sun who draws up water or vapour (from the earth) only to pour it thousandfold (in the shape of rain in autumn.
According to the Smritis the King could not levy taxes at his pleasure and sweet will. The rates of taxes varied according to the commodities and also according to the times if they were normal or there was danger of invasion or some other calamity impending. In Udyogaparva of Mahabharata we have the following shlokas:
 UdyogaParva 34, 17-18.
Just as the bee draws honey but at the same time leaves the flowers uninjured, so the king should take wealth from men without harming them. One (a bee) may search each flower (for honey) but should not cut the very root, just like a garland-maker but not like a coal maker.
Our ancient texts insisted that the king should not be moved by greed in levying taxes lest the very source should dry up in due course. They laid down rules in detail regarding the mode of taxation, rates of taxation and exemptions from taxation. We have only to see those texts to understand how equitable those rules were.
In the end I have to add that in taxation the question is not how many angles can stand on the point of a needle. It is the source of sustenance of a community. At any rate after the amendment of the Preamble of our Constitution by introducing the concept that India is a Socialist State by the 42nd Amendment and the retention of that concept even at the time when the Constitution was amended by the 44th Amendment, any construction of a statute in India should bear the stamp of the concept that we are a Socialist State.
- 309 US 331 (1940)
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- 300 US 5, 12
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- 668 F 2d 1382
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- 1983 STC 176
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- (1964) 44 TC 373
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- 364 F 2d 734
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- 1986 STC 285
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- 1936 AC 1
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- (1943) AC 377 at p. 381
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- (1949) 31 TC 1 at p. 9
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- (1967) 2 AC 18
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- (1968) AC 553, 612
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- (1971) 47 TC 240 at p. 272
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- AIR 1957 SC 657, para 29
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- AIR 1960 SC 1016, para 14
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- 1980 AC 896
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- 1981 STC 174
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- 1980 AC 695
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- 191985 STC 30
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- 201985 AC 809
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- (1984) 1 All ER 530
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- (1985) 3 SCC 230, 242 (para 17)
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- Id. p. 254, para 45
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- (1987) 2 All ER 54
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- 1986 STC 266
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